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My goal here is twofold. First, I want to introduce the theory of 
strategic action fields to the law audience. The main idea in field 
theory in sociology is that most social action occurs in social arenas 
where actors know one another and take one another into account in 
their action. Scholars use the field construct to make sense of how 
and why social orders emerge, reproduce, and transform. Underlying 
this formulation is the idea that a field is an ongoing game where 
actors have to understand what others are doing in order to frame 
their actions. Second, I want to argue that there is a great deal of 
theoretical leverage to be gained by considering law as a field. To 
make all of this more concrete, I use field theory to offer a stylized 
account of the rise of the “shareholder value” movement of the 1980s 
and the use of agency theory as the dominant theory of corporate 
governance to justify the shareholder value revolt. I end by consider-
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The main idea of field theory in sociology is that most social ac-
tion occurs in social arenas where actors know one another and take 
one another into account in their action.1 Fields imply that something 
is at stake and can be won or lost. Fields also imply a stable order, 
one that allows for the reproduction of the actors and their positions 
over time. This general formulation of field theory is sometimes de-
scribed as a meso-level social order. 
The term “meso” refers to the fact that actors are taking each 
other into account in framing actions. This does not mean that all 
actors are individuals. Field theory conceives of actors as including 
individuals, groups, subunits of organizations, organizations, firms, 
professions, and states. Examples of meso-level social orders that 
include both individual and collective actors include groups of 
individuals who work in an office who cooperate over a task, 
subunits of organizations that vie for organizational resources, firms 
that compete with one another to dominate a market, and states that 
come together to negotiate treaties. An important insight that field 
theory yields is that fields are situated within other fields and affect 
one another across their boundaries. Consider the relationships be-
tween individuals in an office, the office situated in a division of a 
corporation, and the corporation situated in a broader field of com-
petitors. 
Scholars use the field construct to make sense of how and why 
social orders emerge, reproduce, and transform. Underlying this for-
mulation is the idea that a field is an ongoing game where actors 
have to understand what others are doing in order to frame their ac-
tions. This idea caused field theorists to consider issues of agency 
and action. They have pursued sociological views of how cognition 
                                                 
 1 . See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J. D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO 
REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (1992); NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUG MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS 
(2012); John Levi Martin, What is Field Theory?, 109 AM. J. SOC. 1 (2003). 
2016] The Theory of Fields 239 
works, focusing on issues of culture, framing, meaning, identity, 
habit, and socialization. While the role of actors in field theory varies 
somewhat across different versions of the theory, field theories ex-
plicitly reject rational actor models and instead rely on phenomenol-
ogy and symbolic interaction as models of actors to understand what 
actors do under varying field conditions. 
Given this flexibility and abstractness, these ideas have profita-
bly been applied to a wide variety of settings, including social 
movements,2 state building,3 state–society relations,4 culture and life-
style, 5  the construction of cultural fields, 6  and various aspects of 
firms and markets.7 
My goal here is twofold. First, I will introduce the theory of 
strategic action fields to the legal audience. I will then argue that 
there is a great deal of theoretical leverage to be gained by consider-
                                                 
 2 . See generally CHRISTOPHER K. ANSELL, SCHISM AND SOLIDARITY IN SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS: THE POLITICS OF LABOR IN THE FRENCH THIRD REPUBLIC (1st ed. 2001); DOUG 
MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930–1970 
(2d ed. 1999); DEBRA C. MINKOFF, ORGANIZING FOR EQUALITY: THE EVOLUTION OF 
WOMEN’S AND RACIAL-ETHNIC ORGANIZATIONS IN AMERICA, 1955–1985 (1995); Elizabeth. 
S. Clemens, Organizational Form as Frame: Collective Identity and Political Strategy in the 
American Labor Movement, 1880–1920, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL 
FRAMING 205 (Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald eds., 1996). 
 3. See generally HENDRIK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS CHANGE (1996). 
 4. See generally FRANK DOBBIN, FORGING INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE UNITED STATES, 
BRITAIN, AND FRANCE IN THE RAILWAY AGE (1994); VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM (Peter A. 
Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); Pierre Bourdieu et al., Rethinking the State: Genesis and 
Structure of the Bureaucratic Field, 12 SOC. THEORY 1 (1994); Peter Hall, The Movement 
from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional Analysis and British Economic Policy in the 
1970s, in STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 90 (Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen & Frank Longstreth eds., 1992). 
 5 . See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTIONS: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE 
JUDGEMENT OF TASTE (Richard Nice trans., 1984). 
 6. See Pierre Bourdieu et al., supra note 4. 
 7. See generally NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC 
SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES (2001) [hereinafter 
FLIGSTEIN, ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS]; NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CORPORATE CONTROL (1990) [hereinafter FLIGSTEIN, CORPORATE CONTROL]; MICHAEL 
USEEM, EXECUTIVE DEFENSE: SHAREHOLDER POWER AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION 
(1993); Gerald F. Davis, Kristina A. Diekmann & Catherine H. Tinsley, The Decline and Fall 
of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational 
Form, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 547 (1994); Neil Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural 
Approach to Market Institutions, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 656 (1996) [hereinafter Fligstein, Mar-
kets as Politics]; Paul Ingram & Hayagreeva Rao, Store Wars: The Enactment and Repeal of 
Anti-Chain-Store Legislation in America, 110 AM. J. SOC. 446 (2004). 
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ing law as a field.8 The courts, legal professionals, law schools, vari-
ous organizations of legal subfields, and constituencies that hire law-
yers, particularly corporations, can be studied as a set of fields that 
have histories, dominant groups, dominant ideas, and trajectories. 
Law is a force that is used to structure field relations outside of 
the legal arena. Indeed, the linkage between state and market is fre-
quently mediated through law.9 To the degree that dominant groups 
are given privileged access to the legal and regulatory system, or 
their practices are codified and enforced as law, dominant groups 
maintain their positions of power. Scholars accept that regulatory and 
cognitive capture occurs routinely.10 Additionally, scholars agree that 
corporations, more or less, get their way in the construction and im-
plementation of law.11 
What is perhaps more interesting is the process by which some 
groups successfully challenge the incumbents in a given field or 
market, reorganize that field or market, and then capture the law and 
regulators in their favor. To make all of this more concrete, I use 
field theory to offer a stylized account of the rise of the “shareholder 
value” movement of the 1980s and the use of agency theory as the 
dominant theory of corporate governance to justify the shareholder 
revolt. 
At the core of the literature on corporate governance is the 
agency theory model in economics.12 This model views the corporate 
governance problem as an issue of how owners of joint-stock corpo-
rations control managers and ensure they work in the corporation’s 
                                                 
 8 . See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERN-
ATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER (1996); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN 
AMERICAN STATES (2002); Stephanie Lee Mudge & Antoine Vauchez, Building Europe on a 
Weak Field: Law, Economics, and Scholarly Avatars in Transnational Politics, 118 AM. J. 
SOC. 449 (2012). 
 9. The classic works in the history of law were all concerned with thinking how law was 
at the center of the relationship between business and the government. For a variety of per-
spectives, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 2005); 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960 (1977); and 
JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970 (2010). 
 10. See PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW 
TO LIMIT IT 71–98 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013). 
 11. See Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity 
of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 407 
(1999). 
 12. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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interests. It views the production of shareholder value, usually de-
fined as raising the share price, as the central purpose of a publicly 
held corporation. This is done through the creation of a set of institu-
tional arrangements that provide carrots and sticks to managers in 
order to get them to perform. The main problem that economists, 
political scientists, and business scholars see is that these institutions 
fail to constrain managers. Because boards of directors do not per-
form their fiduciary oversight, managers take on too much risk be-
cause their time horizons are short. Managers also work to exploit 
boards of directors and increase their pay substantially. But here, 
agency theory proposes that the market for corporate control pro-
vides a backstop, such that poorly performing managers and weak 
boards of directors will be faced with a hostile takeover if they fail to 
maximize shareholder value.13 
Now, field theory’s problem with the agency theory approach is 
that it fails to consider how these ideas were historical creation borne 
out of field dynamics. Roe shows how the entire agency theory story 
is an inaccurate historical account of how the relationship between 
financial markets and publicly held corporations emerged in the 
United States in the 1930s–1950s.14 In order to understand why the 
shareholder value revolution developed, we need to understand who 
the agents were that propagated these ideas in order to gain ad-
vantage and justify their actions. 
The central field where corporate governance is at stake is the 
market for corporate control where the ultimate corporate power—
the ability to own and control corporations—is enacted. The extant 
literature argues that managers dominated corporate governance be-
fore 1980, as they decided who was going to be a target for mergers 
and acquisitions.15 But the economic downturn of the 1970s under-
mined managerial dominance; managers failed to deliver growth, 
profits, or stock price increases. As a result, outside challengers, 
principally different kinds of institutional investors who used the 
capital markets to raise funds to upset sitting management teams and 
reorganize corporations, invaded the market for corporate control.16 
This invasion shifted those in control of the field of corporate control 
                                                 
 13. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 301, 313–18 (1983). 
 14. See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). 
 15. See USEEM, supra note 7. 
 16. See FLIGSTEIN, ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS, supra note 7, at 147–66. 
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from managers to institutional investors. 17  Accompanying this re-
structuring was shareholder value discourse that justified the takeo-
ver of the field. The agency-theory-inspired discourse of shareholder 
value privileged shareholders over other actors, embedding the view 
in corporate law. 
Field theory proves useful to explain when challengers might be 
successful and, once in place, how they maintain power. It provides 
us with less of a theory of what “ought” to be and more of an account 
of what happened. This Article ends by considering whether field 
theory has normative implications. 
I. A THEORY OF STRATEGIC ACTION FIELDS 
The core insight of field theory is that fields are socially con-
structed arenas within which individuals or groups with differing 
resource endowments vie for advantage. 18  For groups to succeed, 
they must engage in strategic social action, by which I mean under-
take actions that take into account what others are doing. The model 
of action that we wish to propose here is one that focuses on social 
skill: the ability to engage cooperatively with others.19 I use the term 
strategic action field (SAF) in order to highlight both the structuring 
of the field and the role of actors in the production and transfor-
mation of the field.20 
Fields are embedded in other fields like a Russian doll. A firm 
may contain product divisions each locked in competition with divi-
sions from other firms; the divisions themselves may fight out for 
others’ resources with each other in the larger firm, and the larger 
firm is embedded in a world of financiers, suppliers, customers, and 
regulators. Each of these might constitute a field for analysts to 
study. This view of SAFs implies that the possibility for collective 
strategic action in modern societies is virtually endless, and the num-
ber of such fields may be impossible to estimate. 
It is necessary to specify what kinds of problems need to be 
solved in order for a stable social space, an SAF, to come into exist-
ence.21 In an unorganized social space, everything is up for grabs: 
                                                 
 17. See id. 
 18. See BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 1, at 94–115; FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, 
supra note 1, at 8–23; Martin, supra note 1, at 1–5. 
 19. See generally Neil Fligstein, Social Skill and Institutional Theory, 40 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 397 (1997). 
 20. This discussion summarizes FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, supra note 1. 
 21. Id. at 8–23. 
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what the purpose of the field is, what positions exist, who occupies 
which position, what the rules of the game are, and how actors come 
to understand what other actors are doing. A stable SAF solves these 
problems, as fields are governed by formal and informal rules. Rules 
are a collectively shared cognitive construct used to control interac-
tions between organizations or groups in an SAF. The nature of these 
rules is to give actors an intersubjective view of what other actors 
mean by their actions. Once in place, the rules comprise the template 
for constructing and interpreting subsequent actions. 
The purpose of fashioning a shared template is, first and fore-
most, to ensure sufficient stability to allow action to take place. 
However, the rules and definitions that emerge define and promote 
the interests and advantages of already existing organizations or 
groups. This is achieved by articulating rules by which actions be-
tween more and less powerful members can be made more predicta-
ble, less threatening, and more rewarding to all. Hence, all forms of 
strategic action oriented towards the creation and maintenance of 
rules are by nature political, in that they involve both contestation 
and alliances. 
One can usefully distinguish between incumbents and challeng-
ers in any given SAF. Incumbents are powerful organizations or 
groups with the necessary political or material resources to enforce 
an advantageous view of appropriate field behavior and definition of 
field membership on other groups. Challengers are organizations or 
groups which define themselves as members of a given SAF, but 
generally accept the given social order and the advantages it gives 
incumbents, either because they fear retribution by incumbents or 
because they see little chance of altering the order in the short run. 
There are two main tactics toward solving the general conflict 
in SAFs: the imposition of a hierarchical power relationship between 
actors or the creation of a political coalition based on cooperation. 
Hierarchy implies a pecking order of groups that can be distinguished 
as incumbents and challengers. The incumbents are generally the 
largest groups that predominantly define the situation and get most of 
the valued objects in the SAF. 22  The challengers are the smaller 
groups who may not totally accept their place in the SAF but are 
generally unable to contest it. The hierarchy of incumbents and chal-
lengers is held in place by coercion or competitive threat. If incum-
bents have overwhelming resources, including the threat of force, 
                                                 
 22. Indeed, that is why we think of them as incumbents! 
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they can coerce challengers and keep them in line by using material 
and psychic threats. 
A political coalition reflects an alliance between two or more 
groups. Cooperation may be based on common identity or interests. 
A political coalition that organizes an SAF can contain explicit 
agreements between groups on the nature of the SAF and how the 
gains and losses will be distributed between groups. Often, groups in 
a political coalition will come to share a common identity, even if 
they did not have one before. This identity defines who is a member 
of the coalition and who is not. 
In reality, hierarchies are not just held in place by coercive or 
competitive advantage, and political coalitions do not rely entirely on 
cooperation. Hierarchies often depend on the tacit consent of chal-
lengers and can even provide some rewards for compliance with a 
hierarchical order. So, incumbents will keep the lion’s share of re-
sources to themselves, but will allow challengers to survive. In re-
turn, challengers will keep their opposition to incumbents in check. 
Political coalitions continue to experience conflict and competition 
on an ongoing basis. Groups in the coalition will believe that they are 
not getting their fair share of rewards or that their vision of the coali-
tion is not being honored. They can try to remake the coalition by 
getting a different configuration of groups and goals recognized. 
II. STRATEGIC ACTION AND SOCIAL SKILL 
Strategic action is the attempt by social actors to create and 
maintain stable social worlds by securing the cooperation of others.23 
In order to engage in strategic action, people have to exercise social 
skill. Social skill is defined as the ability of actors to induce coopera-
tion in other actors in order to produce, contest, or reproduce an or-
der.24 Social skill is based in symbolic interaction, a theory that em-
phasizes both the symbolic and social nature of interaction.25 At the 
core of social skill is the ability to imaginatively identify with the 
mental states of others in order to find collective meanings that moti-
vate others. Social skill entails utilizing a set of methods to induce 
cooperation from one’s own group and other groups.26 Skilled social 
                                                 
 23. See Fligstein, supra note 19, at 398. 
 24. Id. at 397–99. 
 25. For the original explication of this theory, see generally GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, 
MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY (1934). 
 26. Neil Fligstein, Social Skill and the Theory of Fields, 19 SOC. THEORY 105, 105–10 
(2001). 
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actors interpret the actions of others in the field and, on the basis of 
the position of their group, use their perception of current opportuni-
ties or constraints to attain cooperation. 
The definition of social skill highlights how certain individuals 
possess a highly developed cognitive capacity for reading people and 
environments, framing lines of action, and mobilizing people in the 
service of these action “frames.”27 These frames frequently involve 
understandings that are open to interpretation, offering other actors 
identities and resonating with varying groups. Discovering and prop-
agating these frames is a social skill that underscores the “cultural” 
or “constructed” dimension of social action. 
In stable social worlds, skilled strategic actors help to produce 
and reproduce a status quo.28 They are aided by a collective set of 
meanings shared by other actors in which those actors’ identities and 
interests are defined. It is also the case that in “institutionalized” 
social worlds, meanings are “taken for granted” and actions are 
readily framed against those meanings. In unorganized social space, 
the task for skilled strategic actors is somewhat different. Skilled 
actors can become “institutional entrepreneurs.”29 In those situations, 
their ability to help create and maintain collective identities comes to 
the fore and is at the greatest premium. 
By emphasizing the cognitive, empathetic, and communicative 
dimensions of social skill, I hope to underscore that actors who un-
dertake strategic action must be able to use whatever perspective 
they have developed in a sufficiently intersubjective fashion to se-
cure the willing cooperation of others. This kind of skill requires that 
actors have the ability to transcend their own individual and group’s 
narrow self-interest and formulate the problem of the multiple group 
interest, thereby able to mobilize sufficient support for a certain 
shared worldview.30 
A. The Emergence of SAFs 
It is useful to consider more systematically how skilled social 
actors, strategic action, and the relative resources of groups produce 
                                                 
 27. Id. at 108–12; see also David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Ideology, Frame Reso-
nance, and Participant Mobilization, 1 INT’L SOC. MOVEMENT RES. 197 (1988). 
 28. See William H. Sewell, Jr., A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transfor-
mation, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1992). 
 29 . Paul DiMaggio, Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory, in INSTITUTIONAL 
PATTERNS AND ORGANIZATION: CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT 3, 3–21 (Lynne G. Zucker ed., 
1988). 
 30. MEAD, supra note 25, at 322–26. 
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either hierarchically organized SAFs or cooperative SAFs. Action in 
an emergent SAF is often best thought of as akin to a social move-
ment. This is because in unorganized social space, the purpose of the 
field, the positions that exist, who occupies which position, the rules of the 
game, and how actors come to understand what other actors are doing are 
not established. Groups will come into a social space where there is an 
opportunity to offer alternative cultural framings for how to organize 
that space, just as social movement groups do when there is a politi-
cal opportunity. New social spaces are political opportunities. Be-
cause the social space is fluid, there exists the possibility for new 
political coalitions of groups and new social forms of interaction. 
It is useful to understand where such opportunities are generat-
ed. New SAFs are likely to emerge in nearby existing ones. They are 
also likely to be populated by, or offshoots of, existing groups. In-
deed, to the degree that societies become increasingly organized, the 
opportunities for forming new fields are increasing because unor-
ganized fields are spawned by empty spaces created between orga-
nized fields, including those fields and the state. For instance, once 
the dominant biological model of disease won out over its rivals, the 
medical profession and its specialties developed.31 In the case of the 
economy, “new” product markets are often founded near to “old” 
product markets as part and parcel of the search to attain stability for 
the firm.32 Existing SAFs provide opportunities for new SAFs be-
cause they provide the “market” for new ends to emerge. 
In modern society, new SAFs often result from state action. For 
example, as soon as a law is set in place, organizations or groups can 
move in to take advantage of the new opportunities the law creates 
for strategic action. Similarly, organized groups can take their griev-
ances to the state in an attempt to help produce rules to stabilize their 
SAFs. States can also intentionally or unintentionally undermine 
stable SAFs through direct and indirect actions.33   
                                                 
 31. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE 
RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY (1982). 
 32. See HARRISON C. WHITE, MARKETS FROM NETWORKS: SOCIOECONOMIC MODELS OF 
PRODUCTION 266–84 (2d ed. 2004). 
 33. So, for example, antitrust law has been used effectively to undermine the order of 
markets by forcing incumbent firms to change their behavior. This takes away the advantage 
of the dominant firm and can force a reorganization of the market. There can also be unin-
tended consequences from state actions that undermine particular fields. FLIGSTEIN, 
CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 7, at 123–46. The federal government’s legislative re-
sponses to the civil rights movement had the unintended consequence of reorganizing the 
basis of political parties in the United States. The basis of the Democratic Party before the 
1960s was a coalition between white southerners and elements of the northern working class. 
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Furthermore, emergent fields require new cultural tools to make 
sense of what is going on. Emergent fields are the locations in socie-
ty where one expects to see the most innovative forms of action pre-
cisely because more possibilities exist to define the situation. These 
frames can be borrowed from actors in a nearby social space. They 
can also reflect the unique political compromise by which field sta-
bility has been achieved. One could go so far as to argue that almost 
all of the real opportunities to innovate in SAFs occur at their for-
mation. One reason change seems so endemic to modern society is 
that the extension of social organization has the effect of creating 
more unfilled spaces. 
Emergent fields also represent situations in which particularly 
skilled strategic actors, who are able to consider interests outside of 
their own, can make an enormous difference by helping to fashion a 
collective identity that speaks to the interests of many prospective 
field members.34 Indeed, while material resources remain a powerful 
weapon in the struggle to shape the broad cultural contours of the 
emerging field, it is quite possible at this stage for a coalition of rela-
tively impoverished groups to band together under the tutelage of 
skilled strategic actors to overcome better-endowed groups. Success-
ful field projects produce cultural elements that can be borrowed by 
actors in adjacent social spaces.35 
B. Stability in SAFs 
One can say an SAF is stable when the stakes are well under-
stood, the incumbents and challengers are defined, and the rules of 
the game are known. But, “[i]n stable SAFs, constant adjustments are 
being made.”36 The most common form of change occurs when indi-
vidual incumbents or challengers leave the SAF or take up a different 
position vis-à-vis the others. Similarly, “[a] system of ‘rules’ may be 
                                                                                                             
After the Democrats supported civil rights legislation, whites in the South migrated towards 
the Republican Party to form a new political coalition. See DOUG MCADAM & KARINA 
KLOOS, DEEPLY DIVIDED: RACIAL POLITICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN POST-WAR 
AMERICA 3–29 (2014). 
 34. See ANSELL, supra note 2, at 1–16. 
 35. The civil rights movement provided a set of techniques and cultural templates for 
organizing action and a collective identity that subsequent groups adopted. Doug McAdam 
shows that many of the people who participated in the civil rights movement ended up being 
important in the women’s liberation movement that followed. They explicitly borrowed from 
the civil rights movement and applied it to a new field. DOUG MCADAM, FREEDOM SUMMER 
199–232 (1988). 
 36 . Neil Fligstein, Understanding Stability and Change in Fields, 33 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 45 (2013). 
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agreed upon by both incumbents and challengers, but adherence to 
those rules is always more or less.”37 Common understandings can 
themselves become altered, suggesting that these rules can be in 
some form of flux and negotiation. The ongoing field process is thus 
a game that is constantly being played. This means that some rule 
breaking and conflict will characterize stable SAFs. This will result 
in constant system adjustments and testing whereby tactics might 
change, but the overall nature of the field remains intact. 
Incumbents will always work to protect their positions by using 
the advantages built into the fields. But as those advantages are un-
dermined by new tactics on the part of challengers or coalition part-
ners, incumbents will assert their power. Typically, this means trying 
to defend the existing order by using whatever methods they have. 
This is business as usual in stable SAFs. So, while some level of 
conflict and change is ubiquitous in fields, SAFs are constantly mak-
ing accommodations to conditions within and across SAFs, all the 
while preserving the power of incumbents. This suggests that the 
steady state of a field is always somewhat chaotic and contains con-
flict which, in turn, can make it difficult to assess just how close to 
crisis an SAF actually is. 
C. What Causes the Transformation of a Stable Field? 
There may well be instances where a crisis develops in a field 
as a result of gradual, corrosive processes internal to the SAF. Chal-
lenger groups that are learning and adapting may undermine the in-
cumbents’ ability to defend how the field is structured and who gets 
what rewards.38 Most frequently, such innovation on the part of chal-
lengers is met by strategic actors in incumbent groups who work to 
maintain their privileges by figuring out ways to accommodate, co-
erce, or co-opt challengers. 
Most scholars have argued that the opportunity to really trans-
form a field will be the unintended consequence of exogenous shocks 
to the field. Most of the interesting stories we have about institution-
al change in SAFs start with an externally induced crisis.39 Existing 
SAFs are often experiencing some form of turbulence often caused 
by their relationships to other SAFs. This produces piecemeal ad-
                                                 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 45–46. 
 39. For a review of the literature, see Marc Schneiberg & Elisabeth S. Clemens, The 
Typical Tools for the Job: Research Strategies in Institutional Analysis, 24 SOC. THEORY 195 
(2006). 
2016] The Theory of Fields 249 
justments that do not undermine the power of a particular set of in-
cumbents, but might operate to make their ability to control the SAF 
more problematic in the long run. So, for example, incumbents may 
have to make incremental concessions to challengers that undermine 
their positions in the long run. This may make the SAF more open to 
crisis and hence reorganization or invasion. 
Real crisis will be indexed by the failure of incumbents to re-
produce their position. This relatively precise definition allows the 
analyst to recognize that it is the breakdown of the delivery of goods 
to the incumbent that creates the most significant problems for an 
SAF. This will be accompanied by a breakdown in the shared con-
sensus on which SAFs depend. In these moments there is the possi-
bility for momentous change. If the challengers engage in successful 
strategic action, a new social order can be produced. Since all fields 
are connected to other fields, and since some fields are always in 
crisis, it is in the connections between fields that we are likely to 
produce the possibility for change. Such sources of change will al-
ways be reverberating somewhere in a set of SAFs and, therefore, the 
exogenous shock perspective only means that the social world is con-
stantly full of possibilities for transformation. 
Crisis in nearby SAFs is the most frequent cause of significant 
episodes of contention within fields. This is most often the case 
where resource dependencies exist. If one SAF is dependent on an-
other for either the production of input or the consumption of output, 
then crisis in the other field will produce crisis in a given SAF. This 
creates a kind of vertical ripple effect across SAFs. Such crises can 
undermine the very logic of a field, thereby creating opportunities for 
either incumbents or challengers to dramatically change what is at 
stake, who is a winner and loser, and how the new game is 
understood. 
One of the most important sources of change is when other 
groups or organizations invade. This relatively common form of field 
transformation takes one of two forms: the new groups could just be 
trying to assume a position of dominance in the SAF but maintain the 
basic cultural rules regarding the division of power and resources, or 
the new groups could actually be trying to set up the field on entirely 
new terms, restructuring what is at stake, positions and relationships, 
and understandings. The latter is probably more common than the 
former because gaining dominance in the SAF requires a new view 
as to how the SAF should be organized. The invading groups may try 
and make alliances with members of the old incumbent groups or 
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else some of the challengers, on the basis of a new view of reappor-
tionment of resources and conception of the SAF. 
The basic imagery, then, is of a society consisting of millions of 
SAFs linked by various types of relations. Virtually all SAFs are 
connected to the state, either directly or indirectly. SAFs are thought 
to be closer together when their conceptions of control rely on nearby 
SAFs for rules or resources. SAFs are farther apart when there are no 
obvious vertical or horizontal links. A large number of SAFs in mod-
ern societies will always be in some form of crisis and this will in 
turn place other SAFs at risk. Further, invaders or the state can pose 
risks to established SAFs. Those with dominant positions in SAFs 
will respond to crisis by trying to make small adjustments. They will 
be very unlikely to initially undertake large-scale change for two 
reasons: first, they will not be able to conceptualize what that change 
should look like; and second, their first response to crisis will reflect 
their commitment to the existing order from which they benefit. 
D. The Role of Strategic Action in Crisis 
In a crisis, incumbents will initially stick to what got them 
there. This is partially because they are limited by their understand-
ing of how things work. But it is also because their power over re-
sources and their ability to deliver goods depends on that understand-
ing. A second option incumbents will use is to call upon the govern-
ment in a crisis. If they cannot enforce their view, then getting the 
government to recognize their difficulties in order to preserve the 
stability of their SAF is a good tactic.  In market economies, some 
economists see states as distorting markets when they intervene to 
protect or help some set of incumbent firms.40 What they miss, how-
ever, is that the key dynamic of SAFs suggests that before such dom-
inant firms will succumb, they will appeal to the state, precisely be-
cause the state has already conferred legitimacy on the essential 
structure and logic of the field. This is natural because the state is a 
participant in virtually all fields and has a stake in their stability to 
bolster its own legitimacy. If too many fields go under, the state los-
es its control over its own SAFs (after all, they have to be the final 
guarantee of stability) and therefore creates a regime crisis. So, it is 
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axiomatic that an SAF in crisis will eventually have its incumbents 
appeal to the state. 
The crisis of an already existing SAF creates political opportu-
nities for challengers to engage in strategic action. As the existing 
SAF falls apart, the situation looks more and more like the emer-
gence of new SAFs. As an order breaks down, challengers must cre-
ate a larger collective identity that encompasses themselves and oth-
ers. At the moment of flux, if challengers do not recognize that and 
forge a collective identity with other members of the SAF, then the 
political opportunity will be lost. If they stick to the collective identi-
ty that has made them successful challengers, then they are probably 
going to get swept away. 
In short, some group or set of individuals must propose to oth-
ers a way to reorganize the SAF. If they fail to do so, the SAF may 
simply collapse and become unorganized social space. Thus, the dis-
ruption of an SAF does not always result in the construction of a new 
one. Challengers can opt for several alternative solutions to coalition 
building around new collective identities. In particular, they may exit 
the field and migrate to other fields or unorganized social space 
where they will try and set up new social arrangements. The ad-
vantage to this is that they may not have to dilute their collective 
identity. The disadvantage is they might fail and risk the group dis-
banding. They can also work to partition the already existing SAF 
into several SAFs. This can be done by enlisting those who are most 
sympathetic and thus also avoid diluting the collective identity of the 
actors in the field. 
Challengers may go about setting up the new SAF in a variety 
of ways. Successful challengers will orient themselves towards the 
reorganization of the social space by creating a new collective identi-
ty and bringing others along. Challengers have the best chance when 
there are fewer challengers with complementary resources, and 
where one group is significantly bigger than the others. If challenger 
groups are able to communicate and draw on complementary re-
sources, they may successfully find a collective identity. If one of the 
challenger groups is a lot larger than the others and is able to bring 
off a coalition of the others, then the chances of reorganization are 
enhanced. Challengers frequently enlist the state to support whatever 
direction they pursue. A failure to find a new order may result in a 
field drifting in an unorganized state or even the reemergence of in-
cumbents to restore the old order. 
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III. APPLYING THE THEORY OF SAFS TO THE FIELD OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Any reader who has made it this far is probably wondering why 
the use of such an abstract theory as field theory. The abstract nature 
of the approach is actually one of its greatest strengths. Field theory 
is a conceptual framework that is quite useful in understanding how 
real social change occurs. It situates these changes in history, in real 
social arenas that shape interaction, and in the identities and interests 
of individual and collective actors. This kind of conceptual apparatus 
is useful to organize how we think about important changes in busi-
ness and government and the role law plays in such changes. In this 
Part, I show how field theory can be used to make sense of the emer-
gence of the agency theory model of corporate governance that has 
also been referred to as “shareholder value.” 
Cioffi defines corporate governance as a “‘nexus of institutions’ 
defined by company law, financial market regulation, and labour 
law.” 41  Beginning with Berle and Means, scholars have seen the 
joint-stock publicly held corporation as dominated by the managers 
of the largest corporations.42 This has meant that they have controlled 
firms, mostly had power over workers, and organized the market for 
corporate control. The law has generally provided support for this 
dominance. For our purposes, the most important field was the mar-
ket for corporate control. For most of the twentieth century, this 
market was dominated by the managers of the publicly held corpora-
tions and not the financial community. 
Mergers and acquisitions played an important role in helping 
managers make profits for owners. In a previous book, I show that 
managers of the largest corporations in the United States went 
through several periods of change in their perspectives on how to 
make money.43 Central to these changes was the use of mergers and 
acquisitions. Indeed, each of the merger movements during the twen-
tieth century can be seen as the spread of a new way in which firms 
would be organized to make money. In the 1920s, managers focused 
their attention on creating oligopolies by buying shares of firms with-
in their main industries. During the Depression, managers were con-
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cerned about declining business and began to be more concerned 
with sales and marketing. They often used mergers and acquisitions 
to diversify or fill out their product lines. This helped protect them 
against downturns in any given market. 
Beginning in the 1950s, managers with financial backgrounds 
began to assemble conglomerates through mergers. Their key argu-
ment was that the financial markets were unable to value and manage 
assets in order to make profits. Financially savvy executives claimed 
they could manage disparate businesses like a financial portfolio—
they would make investments according to financial criteria and, in 
doing so, would be able to maximize profit. The merger wave, which 
peaked in 1967–1969, saw 40% of the Fortune 500 swallowed up in 
mergers.44 
Throughout most of the century, managers claimed to have the 
knowledge and information to maximize profits. Circa 1970, manag-
ers of publicly held corporations still dominated the market for cor-
porate control. They decided who would get bought and under what 
conditions. The financial markets existed for them to make such in-
vestments. From the perspective of field theory, they were the in-
cumbents. 
After the 1970s, however, American managers lost control over 
the market and, thus, the largest corporations. Due to high inflation 
and slow economic growth in the 1970s, profits and stock prices for 
publicly held corporations fell, even as their underlying assets were 
increasing in value.45 From the perspective of field theory, the eco-
nomic crisis in the country was the exogenous shock that undermined 
the justification for managerial dominance of the market for corpo-
rate control. 
It is useful to understand how this shock played out in the world 
of the financial markets. Slow economic growth meant that the major 
markets of many firms stopped expanding, causing their profits to 
stagnate. The inflation of the 1970s had a set of other negative ef-
fects on corporate balance sheets. Interest rates were quite high over 
this period. These high rates pushed investors towards fixed income 
securities like government bonds and away from stocks, causing 
stock prices to drift downward over the decade. Inflation caused 
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firms to have assets on their books that were increasing in value, but 
from which they were not earning higher profits.46 
Since many measures of firm performance were based on re-
turns on assets or investments, firms looked even less profitable. 
Foreign competition, particularly with the Japanese, heated up. 
American firms lost market shares and, in some cases, entire markets 
(e.g., consumer electronics). Taken together, profit margins were 
squeezed by inflation, competition, and slow economic growth. Thus, 
by the late 1970s, with low stock prices, undervalued assets, and 
slow growth in sales and profits, many large American firms had 
stock prices that valued them as being worth less than the value of 
their assets and cash.47 
During the economic crisis of the 1970s, the existing managerial 
elite who ran large corporations were incumbents that had much at 
stake in their control over the largest corporations. They explained 
the poor performance of their firms to their boards of directors as a 
result of the poor performance of the overall economy. This made 
them unlikely candidates to produce a sweeping new order. From a 
field theory perspective, most managers defended their positions by 
arguing to their boards of directors that they were the people who 
were best situated to ride out the economic storm. In practice, they 
did not borrow money, did not revalue assets on their books that 
were inflating in value, and held on to cash. Instead of taking actions 
to try and alter their situation, most of them sat back and waited for 
better times. 
The theory of fields suggests that when existing ways of manag-
ing fail to produce economic growth or earn profits, new economic 
actors emerge with a new view on how to make money. Once some 
firms demonstrated the efficacy of these tactics in solving a particu-
lar crisis, the tactics frequently spread across the population of the 
largest firms. The actors who pioneered these tactics often came from 
outside the mainstream of business to challenge the existing order. 
These pioneers had to have a critique of the existing order and a set 
of strategies they would impose on firms to solve the problems. 
The questions of who came up with the shareholder value con-
ception of the firm and how they related to those who were already 
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running the largest corporations has been extensively studied.48 Not 
surprisingly, the groups proposing analysis of the shortcomings of 
sitting management teams were the ones who had the least to lose 
and the most to gain by this analysis. There appears to have been a 
number of important actors, including financial analysts in brokerage 
houses, institutional investors like mutual funds and pension funds, 
investment bankers, private equity, insurance companies, and the 
newly formed executive position of chief financial officer. 49  The 
financial community proposed that firms either had to voluntarily 
reorganize to raise profits and stock prices or face getting bought 
out.50 
It is useful to explicate the idea of “maximizing shareholder 
value” both as an ideology and as a set of strategies. Then, one can 
connect it more directly to the various actors who promoted it. The 
main idea is that the job of top managers is to insure that the assets 
of the firm were returning the highest possible profits for their share-
holders. This implies that no other constituency (i.e. workers, com-
munities, or customers) should matter for the decisions that managers 
undertake. Hirsch and Whitley argue that the theory has its roots in 
agency theory, a branch of financial economics that evolved during 
the 1970s.51 Jensen, one of the originators of agency theory, argues 
that the changes that occurred during the 1980s in the market for 
corporate control enhanced efficiency.52 By forcing managers to pay 
more attention to shareholder interests, firms refocused their 
businesses to produce higher returns. 
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The theory underlying shareholder value is that the relationship 
between managers, boards of directors, and equity markets involves 
monitoring, rewarding, and sanctioning managers to maximize the 
returns on assets and, in doing so, raise the price of the stock. 53 
Boards of directors monitor managers by tying their pay to perfor-
mance. If boards find that these incentives do not sufficiently pro-
duce high enough profits, then boards are forced to change 
management teams. If boards of directors fail to monitor managers 
closely enough, the equity markets will punish firms when owners 
begin to sell stock and the share price of the firm drops. This causes 
the overall value of the firm (i.e., the stock price multiplied by the 
number of outstanding shares) to drop. If it drops low enough, the 
firm’s assets and cash will be worth more than the cost of taking the 
firm over. This condition produces the final source of discipline for 
recalcitrant firms: the hostile takeover. Theoretically, a hostile take-
over happens when a new team of owners and managers takes over 
the assets of a corporation by buying them at the depressed price and 
using them more fruitfully in the pursuit of maximizing shareholder 
value. 
The shareholder perspective offered both a criticism of what 
managers were doing circa 1980 and a set of prescriptions about what 
ought to be done about it.54 From the point of view of these critics, 
the main culprits to blame for the problems of American business in 
the early 1980s were managers who had failed to maximize share-
holder value in the 1970s. 55 Put simply, these managers were not 
deploying the assets of firms in such a way as to earn the highest 
possible rates of return. Managers were sitting on undervalued assets 
that were earning low profits. Not surprisingly, stock prices reflected 
the judgment of the market as to how well they were doing. These 
sitting management teams were also accused of controlling their 
boards of directors.56 
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The low stock price relative to the value of assets and cash on 
hand was proof that managers had failed to maximize shareholder 
value. If it was more beneficial to liquidate, rather than continue op-
eration of, a firm, then clearly, managers were to blame. The rhetoric 
of shareholder value began to seep into management practices. 
Useem describes how managers either responded to demands to in-
crease shareholder value by engaging in activities that the financial 
markets valued or, alternatively, they risked becoming takeover tar-
gets.57 
Maximizing shareholder value implies a balance sheet in which 
return on assets is high and growing over time. This encourages 
managers to financially engineer their balance sheets in order to in-
crease the attractiveness of the firm and raise its share price. The 
kind of tactics managers pursued evolved over the twenty-year peri-
od. 
It is useful to review some of what we know about those tactics. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, firms with lots of cash, little debt, and 
low stock prices found that they were likely to be merger targets. 
First, by borrowing money to pay for new companies, the firms be-
came larger, more in debt, and less valuable as takeover targets.58 
Second, managers were told to reevaluate their product lines and sell 
off certain assets. Firms needed to make sure that they were in prof-
itable businesses and were encouraged to divest themselves of un-
profitable businesses. This meant they were encouraged to refocus 
their business on the things they were thought to do best, what in the 
parlance become known as “core competences.”59 Firms, as a result, 
sold off diversified businesses.60 
Third, managers were under pressure to reduce costs by closing 
facilities and laying off workers. Mergers were frequently justified in 
cost-savings terms. Workers who were redundant were laid off, 
product lines that were not profitable were divested, and the newly 
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reorganized, more “focused” firm, would presumably make more 
money.61 Eventually, managers figured out they could give a momen-
tary boost to their stock price by announcing layoffs: a firm’s 
short-term costs would decrease, which might spike the bottom line 
and, therefore, increase returns on assets. 
Using a field theory perspective, Davis and Thompson argue 
that the financial community and managers who embraced the “max-
imizing shareholder value” rhetoric formed a kind of social move-
ment. 62  The financial community used the frame of “maximizing 
shareholder value” to push existing firms toward financial reorgani-
zation; where managers resisted, members of the financial communi-
ty would aid others in doing hostile takeovers. Some managers re-
sisted proponents of maximizing shareholder value. Davis shows 
how managers tried to resist hostile takeovers by creating financial 
devices (including so-called poison pills) to prevent such takeovers.63 
Poison pills flood the market with stock of a firm in the event of a 
hostile takeover bid—diluting stock and forcing those initiating the 
takeover to make a higher offer. 
However, the evidence shows that, overall, the pressure of the 
financial community towards maximizing shareholder value resulted 
in firms engaging in precisely the forms of financial reorganization 
recommended by the financial community.64 In a prior paper, I pro-
vide evidence that firms who were targets of takeovers had underval-
ued assets relative to stock prices.65 I show that firms who engaged in 
mergers, divestitures, and stock buybacks were less likely to be tar-
gets of takeover bids. I also demonstrate that having institutional 
investors on the boards of directors pushed managers to engage in 
financial reorganization. 
Evidence shows that firms reduced the number of products they 
produced by merging with firms producing similar products and di-
vesting unrelated product lines. 66  Zorn and his colleagues demon-
strate that the number of mergers involving diversification dropped 
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precipitously during the 1980s.67 There was a steep rise in mergers in 
firms’ main product lines. There was also a substantial rise in verti-
cal mergers (i.e., the purchase of upstream suppliers or downstream 
customers). Scholars have demonstrated how these changes reorient-
ed top managers towards institutional investors. 
Within the corporation, the title “Chief Financial Officer” 
(CFO) was used to describe the executive who interfaced with the 
financial markets to explain how the actions of the firm were going 
to raise profits and affect share price.68 On the market side, financial 
analysts who worked for large brokerage firms were the main targets 
for such messages. In order to attain “buy” recommendations from 
these analysts, CFOs and “Chief Executive Officers” (CEOs) needed 
evidence showing strategic changes in line with increasing share 
prices. Stock analysts were guiding corporations to focus their prod-
uct lines so that firms’ prospects could be easily evaluated.69 
Shareholder value was a historical system that entered the 
American business scene during the early 1980s. The invasion of the 
market for corporate control by financial institutions under the 
shareholder value rubric was about the assertion of power by the 
largest institutional investors over the management teams that led the 
largest corporations. It involved a realignment of the relationships 
between managers and financial markets, with the investors in those 
markets coming to dominate the largest corporations. The rise of 
agency theory-inspired, shareholder value-driven capitalism was, 
first and foremost, about the rise of finance and its new powerful grip 
over American corporations. This domination was achieved through 
the use of a set of financial devices that were applied to the activities 
of firms to measure the degree to which managers’ strategies pro-
duced increases in shareholder value, measured by various kinds of 
financial statistics and, of course, the share price. 
The shareholder value agenda of institutional investors success-
fully reorganized American society in profound ways. For example, 
since 1980, the share of national income in the United States going to 
capital has risen from 34% to 42%, while the share for labor has 
dropped from 66% to 58%.70 At the same time, wealth and income 
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inequality over the period have soared. A set of recent studies show 
that, at the economy, industry, and firm levels, the main source driv-
ing this redistribution of income from labor to capital has been the 
shareholder value revolution.71 
Field theory suggests that the new incumbents in the market for 
corporate control are those who run the financial markets and those 
who invest in them. Their takeover of that market and their reorient-
ing the view of managers of publicly held corporations to focus on 
raising the share price has been highly advantageous to its principal 
beneficiaries. The U.S. model of how to make money in the largest 
publicly held corporations has shifted dramatically in the past 150 
years. 72 This suggests that one should try to understand corporate 
governance not as a static set of concepts, but as a historical and cul-
tural phenomenon that reflects the power of some actors over others 
and their difference across settings.73 
The historical understanding of this system means that someday 
it will collapse. What will cause it to collapse is not scholars who are 
critical of this institution, but, instead, a massive crisis where the 
largest corporations using financial techniques fail to make profit or, 
alternatively, where the interests of shareholders alter dramatically. I 
note that the financial crisis of 2007–2009 was not enough to dis-
lodge the shareholder value view of corporations. This shows that a 
crisis is not enough for change. In order for there to be substantive 
change, an alternative must emerge and actors who carry the banner 
of that alternative must be in the position to reorganize the field. As 
long as shareholder value tactics continue to work for institutional 
investors, the shareholder value and agency theory perspective will 
continue to dominate. But, this does not mean that those models will 
not eventually transform. 
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CONCLUSION 
The theory of fields offers a great deal of conceptual clarity to 
the transformation of the field of corporate governance in the past 
forty years. By focusing on who the players are, what the basis of 
their power is, and how they enforce that power, we can examine the 
historical process by which new conceptions of the corporation and 
corporate governance emerge. This Article provides a stylized ac-
count of the emergence of the agency-based, shareholder value per-
spective, focusing on how the crisis of the 1970s manageri-
al-dominated field of corporate governance produced the conditions 
for a new way to organize corporate governance to emerge. The 
shareholder value revolution was literally a transformation of the 
relationships between managers, investors, financial markets, and 
workers. This reorganization has worked greatly to the benefit of the 
winners (owners of capital and CEOs) and has made things worse for 
the losers (workers and everyone who earns just a salary). 
Much of the literature in economics, business studies, and polit-
ical science that is critical of the shareholder value model implicitly 
accepts the assumption that the model, in its idealized form, is what 
good corporate governance should be. For these scholars, the main 
issue for corporations is remaining vigilant and ensuring these insti-
tutions constrain managers. From their perspective, it is the failure of 
boards of directors to do their fiduciary oversight that allows manag-
ers to be out of control. This means that the current system encour-
ages managers to take on too much risk because their time horizons 
are short and, if they are successful, to increase their pay substantial-
ly.74 
The field perspective shows why those critical of the sharehold-
er value perspective are unlikely to have much luck in changing the 
system as it exists. The investor class does not fail to benefit merely 
because sometimes managers take added risks or act in their own 
interests. The critique that shareholder value does not leave space for 
stakeholders or provide concerns for labor and the environment, alt-
hough well-intentioned, misses the very way the system works. A 
society where the only actors who matter are shareholders is the one 
we have in America. This allows these actors to undertake actions 
that benefit only themselves and, as the sociological literature has 
shown, there has been a redistribution of national income from work-
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ers and lower-level managers to top managers and investors. Stake-
holders cannot matter when the system is built to exploit their weak-
nesses. 
One advantage of agency theory and the shareholder value per-
spective is that it offers both a positive account of the most efficient 
ways to organize and a moral critique of any system that does not 
conform to that vision. Field theory does not have a straightforward 
normative model. It is not about a justification for a particular nor-
mative order per se. Indeed, by revealing the interests and identities 
of key players in any field, field theory is more about unmasking 
how things work and what holds them in place. Knowing these facts 
can help scholars and critics make arguments about how such sys-
tems are not exactly what their proponents claim—the best way to 
organize. But, they leave open the issue of what might be better and 
more justifiable for other actors. I think field theory can be deployed 
in such endeavors by appealing to how the current order is less fair 
and equitable, principles that can be deployed to judge any set of 
institutional arrangements. 
Finally, field theory might prove useful to legal scholars who 
want to have a better understanding of how particular legal argu-
ments came to have so much power in structuring social relationships 
within and across fields. I have demonstrated that agency theory and 
shareholder value were historical constructs that have benefitted cor-
porations and their owners. Legal arguments that support that takeo-
ver can be understood and perhaps attacked by trying to expose how 
they were social constructions. 
 
 
